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Towards Increased Reliability by Objectification of Hazard 1 
Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) of Automated Automotive 2 
Systems 3 
 4 
Abstract 5 
Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) in various domains like automotive, aviation, process 6 
industry etc. suffer from the issues of validity and reliability. While there has been an increasing 7 
appreciation of this subject, there have been limited approaches to overcome these issues. In the 8 
automotive domain, HARA is influenced by the ISO 26262 international standard which details 9 
functional safety of road vehicles. While ISO 26262 was a major step towards analysing hazards and 10 
risks, like other domains, it is also plagued by the issues of reliability. In this paper, the authors 11 
discuss the automotive HARA process. While exposing the reliability challenges of the HARA 12 
process detailed by the standard, the authors present an approach to overcome the reliability issues. 13 
The approach is obtained by creating a rule-set for automotive HARA to determine the Automotive 14 
Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) by parametrizing the individual components of an automotive HARA, 15 
i.e., severity, exposure and controllability. The initial rule-set was put to test by conducting a 16 
workshop involving international functional safety experts as participants in an experiment where 17 
rules were provided for severity and controllability ratings. Based on the qualitative results of the 18 
experiments, the rule-set was re-calibrated. The proposed HARA approach by the creation of a rule-19 
set demonstrated reduction in variation. However, the caveat lies in the fact that the rule-set needs to 20 
be exhaustive or sufficiently explained in order to avoid any degree of subjective interpretation which 21 
is a source of variation and unreliability. 22 
Keywords: Hazard, HARA, ISO 26262, Functional Safety, Reliability 23 
1. Introduction 24 
Over 90% of the on-road accidents occur due to human error (Singh, 2015). Therefore, an ability to 25 
assist or replace the human driver in the driving task has a potential to reduce the number of accidents. 26 
The introduction of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) and Automated Driving (AD) 27 
systems has been driven by the fact that these systems will be able to improve road traffic safety. This 28 
is due to the higher ability of an automated system to react to a possible hazardous situation as 29 
compared to the most alert manual driver (Carbaugh et al., 1998). Apart from safety benefits, AD 30 
systems and ADAS also offer the potential for increased operational efficiency by increasing road 31 
through-put by reducing the proximity between vehicles (Bishop, 2000; Kesting et al., 2008; van 32 
Arem et al., 2005). 33 
In 1996, Sweden adopted a “Vision Zero” policy which states that “eventually no one will be killed or 34 
seriously injured within the road transport system” (Johansson, 2009). It brought together multiple 35 
stakeholders like vehicle manufacturers, road designers, state, city councils, municipalities and 36 
individuals, in order to achieve the mission of zero on-road fatalities. According to Vision Zero’s 37 
viewpoint, a holistic approach needs to be adopted. While changes in vehicles is a major aspect of the 38 
solution (with the introduction of passive safety, active safety and automated features), other aspects 39 
include changes in roads, streets, knowledge/awareness of individuals and legislations (Tingvall, 40 
1998). While the principles of Vision Zero concept is valid for every country, the identification of 41 
changes and their implementation differs from country to country and the cultural aspect of the 42 
country needs to be taken into consideration in the strategic analysis plan (Johansson, 2009). 43 
While ADAS and AD systems are an important part of achieving a Vision Zero concept, both ADAS 44 
and AD systems offer new challenges for testing and the safety analysis of the systems (Khastgir et 45 
al., 2015). Variety of ADAS and AD systems exist or are in development, each of them offer a 46 
different kind of a challenge. As we move towards higher levels of automation in the SAE’s six levels 47 
of automation (level 0-5) (SAE International, 2016), testing and risk analysis becomes harder as it 48 
needs to include larger number of variables and their interactions in the analysis. The authors discuss 49 
risk analysis within the scope of this paper. Section 1.1 discusses risk analysis in a general setting, 50 
section 1.2 briefly discusses reliability through objectification of the risk analysis process and section 51 
1.3 discusses automotive risk analysis. 52 
1.1. Reliability and Validity of Risk Analysis 53 
Safety analysis is a two-step process. In the first step one needs to identify the hazards for which the 54 
Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) is to be performed. There are various methods for 55 
identifying hazards like System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) / Systems Theoretic Accident 56 
Model & Processes (STAMP) (Leveson, 2004, 2011a, 2011b), JANUS (Hoffman et al., 2004), 57 
Accimaps (Salmon et al., 2012), HFACS (Baysari et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2013; D. Wiegmann and 58 
Shappell, 2001), Fault-tree analysis (Lee et al., 1985; Reay and Andrews, 2002), bow-tie analysis 59 
(Abimbola et al., 2016; Khakzad et al., 2012), FMEA (Stamatis, 2003), etc. Some of these methods 60 
were developed for simpler systems and fall short in their ability to meet the requirements for the 61 
analysis of modern systems which have multiple interactions between the system and software 62 
components and the human operator (Fleming et al., 2013). Another source of identifying hazards is 63 
from experience of previous accidents and their accident investigations. However, being retrospective 64 
in nature, they cannot be taken as the only source of possible hazards, but should influence future 65 
hazard identification process and safety management process (Stoop and Dekker, 2012). While 66 
accident investigations provide new knowledge about the possible avenues of system failures, they are 67 
never exhaustive. This is evident by the deja-vu experience of similar accidents repeating themselves 68 
in a 20-30 year cycle (Le Coze, 2013). Identifying hazards has its challenges and is a research 69 
question in its own right. While it is possible to identify hazards based on the “known knowns” and 70 
accommodate for the “known unknowns”, it is extremely difficulty to foresee the unknown knowns 71 
and even more so for the “unknown unknowns” which form the “Black Swan” category for hazards 72 
(Aven, 2013). Previous accidents, however, provide an insight to the occurrence of “Black Swan” type 73 
of accidents by increasing experts’ knowledge of possible factors for risk analysis (Khakzad et al., 74 
2014). While the authors appreciate that hazard identification is an important area for research with 75 
on-going activities, it remains out of scope of this paper. Identification of hazards will be discussed by 76 
the authors in future publications. 77 
The second step of the safety analysis process involves the analysis of the hazard and the 78 
corresponding risk assessment for the hazard. Risk in general has been suggested to be a construct and 79 
not an attribute of the system (Goerlandt and Montewka, 2015), due to the subjective nature of risk 80 
(Aven, 2010a; Tchiehe and Gauthier, 2017). However, in the automotive domain, a decomposition of 81 
risk provides a different insight. An Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) rating in automotive 82 
HARA comprises of a severity, exposure and a controllability rating. Controllability and Severity of 83 
any system are a system attribute. However, exposure for a system remains a construct and is open to 84 
subjective variation as it is influenced by the expert’s knowledge which governs the probability rating 85 
(Aven, 2010b; Aven and Reniers, 2013). Automotive HARA and ASIL will be discussed in detail in 86 
section 2-6. This paper deals with the classification of hazards (once they have been identified) and 87 
their subsequent risk assessment. 88 
While HARA governs the risk management, i.e., the mitigation steps and the rigour required in the 89 
application of the steps; it is plagued by some fundamental challenges of its validity and reliability 90 
(Aven and Zio, 2014). One of the fundamental issues with risk assessment is the biases or 91 
assumptions made by stakeholders performing the assessment due to subjective interpretation of the 92 
underlying process or lack of knowledge of the underlying uncertainties or lack of knowledge of the 93 
system safety. Lack of knowledge or improper knowledge about the system may lead to either 94 
ignoring possible risk (which may lead to false negatives) or their exaggeration (which may lead to 95 
false positives). This introduces uncertainty in the risk analysis which is not taken into consideration 96 
while making decisions (Goerlandt and Reniers, 2016). Additionally, the knowledge of the hazards 97 
and possible failures helps guide the design process of the systems by providing the ability to make 98 
informed design decisions in the design phase of the product (Björnsson, 2017; Villa et al., 2016). 99 
Reliability refers to the “extent to which a framework, experiment, test, or measuring instrument 100 
yields the same results over repeated trials” (Carmines and Zeller, 1979). In a review of Quantitative 101 
Risk Analysis (QRA) method applications, (Goerlandt et al., 2016) found that significant differences 102 
existed in the results of QRA conducted by different teams/groups of experts. While mandating a 103 
specific QRA method could reduce variation (Van Xanten et al., 2013), they argued that this would 104 
not ascertain the accuracy of the results, but make results converge and more comparable. 105 
For HARA to be scientific, it needs to be reliable (Hansson and Aven, 2014). In this paper, the 106 
authors adopt the “reliability” definition and types of reliability as defined by (Aven and Heide, 107 
2009)(pg. 1863): 108 
 “The degree to which the risk analysis methods produce the same results at reruns of these 109 
methods (R1). 110 
 The degree to which the risk analysis produces identical results when conducted by different 111 
analysis teams, but using the same methods and data (R2) 112 
 The degree to which the risk analysis produces identical results when conducted by different 113 
analysis team with the same analysis scope and objectives, but no restrictions on methods and 114 
data (R3)” 115 
1.2. Reliability through objectivity 116 
According to Cambridge English Dictionary (“Cambridge English Dictionary,” 2017), “objectivity” is 117 
defined as “the state or quality of being objective and fair”, where “objective” is defined as “based on 118 
real facts and not influenced by personal beliefs or feelings”. In order to prevent the influence of 119 
personal beliefs and mental models of experts leading to varied and unreliable HARA ratings, the 120 
authors propose the introduction of a rule-set to introduce objectivity in the process. Objectivity could 121 
potentially be a tool to help provide consistency and convergence of HARA ratings, thus providing 122 
increased reliability.  123 
1.3. Automotive Functional Safety 124 
In the automotive domain, the ISO 26262-2011 standard (automotive functional safety international 125 
standard) lacks a quantified and a robust process for automotive certification (Yu et al., 2016). The 126 
standard refers to ASIL as a metric for hazard analysis which is influence by Severity (S), Exposure 127 
(E) and Controllability (C) rating. However, the methodology for determining these parameters and 128 
their quantification is not mentioned. Instead a set of sample tables have been provided (Ellims and 129 
Monkhouse, 2012). SAE J2980 provides some guidance to certain degree of objectivity to automotive 130 
HARA. But it too falls short in defining various aspects influencing severity, exposure and 131 
controllability rating (SAE International, 2015). SAE J2980 provides one table to parametrise severity 132 
using speed and collision type as parameters. It doesn’t provide any guidance for controllability and 133 
exposure ratings. Even for severity, the parameters used are not exhaustive enough. 134 
Thus, there is a need for creating a method for extracting patterns and creating templates for safety 135 
case development which would influence the HARA (Kelly, 2004).  While ISO 26262 (2011) - Part 3 136 
(ISO, 2011a) comprehensively describes the hazard analysis and identification of hazards using 137 
various methods like HAZOP (Cagno et al., 1960), FMEA etc.; it falls short of identifying an 138 
objective rating methodology for the hazardous events identified. This leaves the rating to the skills 139 
and the mental model of the domain technical experts performing the rating task. An expert’s mental 140 
model is created and influenced by their own knowledge, experience and environment, leading them 141 
to base their risk analysis on some underlying assumptions (Rosqvist, 2010). Any risk rating given by 142 
an expert is dependent on the expert’s interpretation of the background knowledge (based on their 143 
mental model) related to the hazard. This background knowledge may be incomplete in three specific 144 
areas: structure of the hazard, parameters responsible for the hazard and probabilities for the 145 
parameters (Aven and Heide, 2009). Thus the mental model formed by the expert is a limited 146 
representation of the real world. In addition, the dominance of various factors influencing expert’s 147 
mental model differ at different points in time for the same expert, leading to a varying decision 148 
making analysis. Thus, the following two types of variations exist in industry when hazard analysis 149 
and risk assessment is performed: 150 
 Inter-rateability variation: due to different mental models between different experts or 151 
different groups of experts 152 
 Intra-rateability variation: due variation in mental models of the same expert or same group of 153 
experts at different points in time 154 
In a study to evaluate the reliability of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 155 
(HFACS) (Shappell et al., 2007; D. A. Wiegmann and Shappell, 2001), which is a retrospective 156 
accident analysis framework, it was found that while training of experts improved reliability of the 157 
analysis, the results demonstrated significant inter- and intra-rater variation (Ergai et al., 2016). Even 158 
classification of a hazardous event as a “black swan” is of subjective nature and is prone to inter-rater 159 
variations. It is also influence by knowledge or beliefs of the experts which is based on their 160 
individual mental models (Aven, 2015; Flage and Aven, 2015). 161 
1.4. Research Question 162 
In order to overcome this challenge, an approach would be to increase focus on the knowledge aspect 163 
of HARA by having two teams independently performing the HARA. The role of the second team 164 
being to check the bias and the assumptions made by the first team (Veland and Aven, 2015). While 165 
such an approach has its merits, it is not practical to adopt this approach in the automotive industry 166 
due to the time and human resource required for the approach. The automotive industry is 167 
overwhelmed by time and cost constraints to meet production deadlines, therefore a novel approach is 168 
required for addressing the reliability issues of the automotive HARA process, while meeting 169 
constraints of the automotive industry.  170 
While existing literature acknowledges the reliability issues, a solution to tackle the inter- and intra-171 
rater variation still evades the research community. The work presented in this paper focusses on 172 
increasing reliability of the automotive HARA process by objectivising the severity and 173 
controllability ratings by introducing a rule-set for both the ratings. No rule-set was provided for 174 
exposure ratings, as according to the analysis of the authors and independent functional safety experts, 175 
the exposure ratings would have remained constant for the system and scenario under consideration. 176 
This work is one of the first steps towards achieving reliable ratings through an objective decision 177 
making process for HARA. The three research questions focussed in this paper are: How to improve 178 
the inter-rater-reliability of the automotive HARA process ((R2 and R3 aspects of reliability)? Can 179 
introduction of a rule-set for HARA improve the reliability of an automotive HARA? If yes, what 180 
does the rule-set comprise of? 181 
In section two, the automotive HARA process is briefly discussed. Section three discusses the 182 
methodology of the study. In section four, the initial rule-set is introduced and section five discusses 183 
the validation of the rule-set. Section six provides a discussion on the approach, section seven 184 
discusses some of the future work and section eight concludes the paper. 185 
2. Automotive HARA 186 
2.1. ASIL 187 
The ISO 26262 – 2011defines Automotive Safety Integrity Level or ASIL as “one of four levels to 188 
specify the item's or element's necessary requirements of ISO 26262 and safety measures to apply for 189 
avoiding an unreasonable residual risk with D representing the most stringent and A the least 190 
stringent level”. Various ASIL levels identified by ISO 26262-2011 are QM, ASIL A, ASIL B, ASIL 191 
C, and ASIL D, where QM (quality management) denotes that lowest integrity level with no 192 
requirements to comply with ISO 26262 and ASIL D applies the most stringent requirements on 193 
product development cycle to comply with ISO 26262. The difference in requirements is also evident 194 
in Table 2. Based on the severity, exposure and the controllability rating, an ASIL rating is 195 
determined using the ASIL determination table specified in the ISO 26262 – 2011 Part 3 (ISO, 2011a) 196 
(Table 1), which shows the relation between them. The ISO 26262 standard provides ASIL dependent 197 
requirements for the development process of safety functions involving hardware and software 198 
components. The level of rigour required for higher ASIL values is considerably high as compared to 199 
a lower ASIL value. Therefore, the automotive industry is always driven towards lower ASIL values 200 
in order to keep their development costs down. This inherent bias can also sometimes lead to an 201 
inconsistency in the ASIL ratings. 202 
Table 1: ASIL determination table (adapted from ISO 26262 – 2011: Part 3 (ISO, 2011a)) 203 
Severity Class Exposure class 
Controllability class 
C1 C2 C3 
S1 
E1 QM QM QM 
E2 QM QM QM 
E3 QM QM A 
E4 QM A B 
S2 
E1 QM QM QM 
E2 QM QM A 
E3 QM A B 
E4 A B C 
S3 
E1 QM QM A 
E2 QM A B 
E3 A B C 
E4 B C D 
 204 
The difference in the requirements for development processes to be followed for various ASIL levels 205 
is mentioned in the standard via many tables. Table 2 illustrates the increased rigour required in the 206 
methods for software unit testing as the ASIL level increases. For an ASIL C and ASIL D system, 207 
back-to-back comparison test between model and code is highly recommended as per the standard 208 
which adds considerable cost to the product development cycle. 209 
Table 2: Methods for the verification of the requirements (adapted from ISO 26262 – 2011: Part 6 (ISO, 2011b)) 210 
 Method ASIL A ASIL B ASIL C ASIL D 
1a Requirements-based test ++ ++ ++ ++ 
1b Interface test ++ ++ ++ ++ 
1c Fault injection test + + + ++ 
1d Resource usage test + + + ++ 
1e 
Back-to-back comparison test between model and code, if 
applicable 
+ + ++ ++ 
++ : highly recommended; + : recommended; o : no recommendation for or against 
2.2. Severity 211 
The ISO 26262 – 2011defines “severity” as “estimate of the extent of harm to one or more individuals 212 
that can occur in a potentially hazardous situation”, for the driver or the passengers of the vehicle or 213 
other vulnerable road users like cyclists, pedestrians in the vicinity of the vehicle. The standard refers 214 
to the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) (Baker et al., 1974) as one of the methods for calculating the 215 
severity rating. The standard defines four classes for severity: 1) S0 (no injuries) 2) S1 (Light and 216 
moderate injuries) 3) S2 (Sever and life threatening injuries) 4) S3 (life-threatening injuries, fatal 217 
injuries). 218 
2.3. Exposure 219 
The ISO 26262 – 2011defines “exposure” as “state of being in an operational situation that can be 220 
hazardous if coincident with the failure”. The standard defines five classes for exposure: 1) E0 221 
incredible 2) E1 (very low probability: Occurs less often than once a year for the great majority of 222 
drivers) 3) E2 (low probability: Occurs a few times a year for the great majority of drivers) 4) E3 223 
(medium probability: Occurs once a month or more often for an average driver) 5) E4 (high 224 
probability: occurs during almost every drive on average). 225 
2.4. Controllability 226 
The ISO 26262-2011 (ISO, 2011c) standard states that “the evaluation of the controllability is an 227 
estimate of the probability that the driver or other persons potentially at risk are able to gain 228 
sufficient control of the hazardous event, such that they are able to avoid the specific harm”. 229 
While the standard classifies controllability into four classes: 1) C0 (Controllable in general) 2) C1 230 
(simply controllable: 99 % or more of all drivers or other traffic participants are usually able to avoid 231 
harm) 3) C2 (normally controllable: 90 % or more of all drivers or other traffic participants are 232 
usually able to avoid harm) 4) C3 (difficult to control or uncontrollable: less than 90 % of all drivers 233 
or other traffic participants are usually able, or barely able, to avoid harm), it fails to elaborate on the 234 
criteria for the classification and defining the levels in a more objective manner. This introduces a 235 
degree of vagueness and subjectivity to the classification. To give a rating for controllability, the 236 
experts needs to understand how a driver/operator would react to a hazard caused by a failure for any 237 
given situation to have a valid rating. As discussed in section 1, such an analysis will be based on the 238 
expert’s mental model and background knowledge leading to inter-rater variation, as the assumptions 239 
and mental models may differ significantly between experts. The two distinct short-comings of the 240 
current ISO 26262-2011 standard are guided by the subjective nature of the experts’ mental models 241 
leading to unreliable ratings and the ability to identify a hazard (including the black swan events). 242 
Additionally, controllability argument changes when an autonomous system is considered as the 243 
driver is no longer a fall-back option. 244 
3. Methodology 245 
In order to answer the research question detailed in section 1.4, the authors created a rule-set for 246 
severity and controllability ratings. To test the hypothesis that a rule-set could increase the objectivity 247 
of the HARA process and potentially lead to convergence, a workshop study involving international 248 
functional safety experts was conducted. The workshop was modelled on the World Café method 249 
(Fouche and Light, 2011). 250 
3.1. Ethical Approval 251 
Ethical approval for the workshop was secured from the University of Warwick’s Biomedical & 252 
Scientific Research Ethics Committee (BSREC). All data gathered from the workshop was treated in a 253 
confidential manner, in accordance with the University of Warwick’s Data Protection Policy1. 254 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants. 255 
3.2. Participants 256 
Twelve participants were involved in the workshop, who had experience in automotive functional 257 
safety assessments. Eight out of the 12 participants identified themselves as automotive functional 258 
safety specialists and had taken part in international ISO 26262 functional safety technical committee 259 
discussions. The remaining four participants identified themselves as development/systems engineer 260 
applying automotive functional safety principles in their function development process. Participants 261 
represented different levels of supply chain across the automotive supply chain. Two participants 262 
were from OEM (original equipment manufacturer), seven were from Tier One suppliers, two were 263 
from Tier Two suppliers and remaining one participant was from academia/research organization 264 
background. All participants were from North America and Europe. 265 
3.3. Workshop structure 266 
Participants were grouped into three groups of four participants each. The workshop consisted of an 267 
introduction which was followed by four rounds of 25 minutes each. Each group was provided with 268 
two different hazardous events and were asked to rate the two given hazardous events. The same 269 
hazardous events were given in each of the four rounds. Figure 1 shows the workshop structure. 270 
In the introduction stage, participants were briefed about the system for which they were being asked 271 
to perform the HARA.  272 
Before starting the rounds of discussion for HARA, each group (assigned a table) was asked to 273 
nominate one participant as the moderator for the group. In round one, each group was supposed to 274 
discuss and come to a consensus for each of the two hazardous events, on a rating for Severity (S), 275 
Exposure (E) and Controllability (C) and subsequently for ASIL. After round one, the members of the 276 
groups were shuffled, but the moderator for each group remained same. The shuffling was done in a 277 
way that the table had at least two new participants as compared to the previous round. In round two, 278 
the new groups were asked to discuss and give a ratings for S, E and C. After round two, participants 279 
were provided with a rule-set by the authors for conducting HARA. The participants were instructed 280 
how to use the rule-set. Participants were instructed not to question the rules for their validity. 281 
However, they were given the freedom to interpret the rules as per their understanding. In round three, 282 
participants used the provided rule-set for HARA to complete the task of S, E and C ratings for the 283 
two hazardous events. The groups were same in round two and round three. After round three, the 284 
groups were again shuffled, but the moderator for the groups remained the same. In round four, the 285 
new groups were again tasked to use the rule-set for HARA (provided to them) to rate the two hazards 286 
for S, E and C. The mixing of groups after round 1 and round 3 helps address the research question of 287 
inter-rater variability (with and without the rule-set). Moderators were asked to provide a brief 288 
explanation of the discussion in each round and the reasoning behind the rating for each of the 289 
parameters (S, E and C). 290 
This provided a possibility to perform both quantitative and qualitative analysis on the gathered data 291 
which includes the ratings in each round (quantitative) and the moderators’ explanation in each round 292 
(qualitative). 293 
At the end of four rounds, each group was asked to provide feedback on the workshop by answering 294 
two questions:  295 
 (During the workshop) Have you experienced variation in hazard analysis discussions based 296 
on the group of people involved in the discussion? 297 
                                                     
1 Available at: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/services/vco/exec/registrar/legalservices/dataprotection/ accessed on 14 March 2017 
 298 
 Do you think by having rules by parametrizing hazard analysis, we can have a more objective 299 
approach? 300 
3.3.1. System definition 301 
Participants were asked to perform a HARA for the provided hazard and hazardous events for a Low 302 
Speed Autonomous Vehicle (LSAV). i.e. a pod. The system features presented to the participants 303 
were: 304 
 Fully Autonomous (SAE Level 5 autonomous vehicle) 305 
 Connected vehicle with Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) capability 306 
 Emergency stop button. No trained safety driver 307 
 No steering wheel or pedals 308 
 Top speed of 25 km per hour 309 
Participants were asked to make the assumption that the current ISO 26262-2011 Part 3, which is an 310 
automotive functional safety standard for passenger vehicles is applicable for LSAV/pod. Participants 311 
were advised to use the ASIL determination table which was provided to them during the workshop 312 
from the mentioned standard. 313 
3.3.2. Hazard definition 314 
The hazard provided to the participant was “Collision (of pod) with static or dynamic obstacle due to 315 
stopping or accelerating to a vulnerable position”. Based on the hazard, participants were provided 316 
two hazardous events and were asked to discuss the HARA for the two given events to give S, E and 317 
C ratings. The two hazardous events provided were: 318 
 Pod travels into pedestrian / cyclist 319 
 Pod does unintended braking 320 
Figure 1: Workshop structure 
The hazard provided was identified after conducting in-depth hazard analysis for a low-speed 321 
autonomous vehicle and a qualitative analysis was carried out on the explanation for the analysis. The 322 
in-depth hazard analysis was conducted by independent functional safety experts involved in the UK 323 
Autodrive2 project. The hazard and the hazardous events definition for the pod was a result of this 324 
HARA. Various functions like Torque management, braking and route planning could cause the given 325 
hazard. However, all functions causing the hazard were related to vehicle’s movement.  326 
4. Initial rule-set 327 
The initial rule-set is comprised of rules for severity and controllability ratings, while no rules were 328 
generated for exposure. The authors in their analysis of the hazards with a different set of experts had 329 
come to a conclusion that the exposure rating for the given hazardous events and the given system 330 
(discussed in section 3.3.1 and section 3.3.2) will most certainly be E4 (highly probable).  In order to 331 
objectify the HARA process, severity and controllability ratings’ rule-set were parametrized in terms 332 
of factors identified by the authors. While various hazards and hazardous events were identified, 333 
various parameters were used to classify a hazardous event. These included acceleration value, 334 
velocity etc. The first set of parameters were identified from this set. In addition, existing literature 335 
was reviewed for factors influencing severity and controllability (Baker et al., 1974; Ellims and 336 
Monkhouse, 2012; Green, 2000; Lortie and Rizzo, 1998; Monkhouse et al., 2015; Summala, 2000; 337 
Verma and Goertz, 2010). The parametrization of the HARA components should help meet the R1, 338 
R2 and R3 reliability criteria defined by (Aven and Heide, 2009) by objectivising the decision making 339 
process involved in HARA ratings. Figure 2 depicts the process of development of the initial rule-set, 340 
along with stakeholder roles at each step. Due to logistical reasons, a condensed version of the rule-set 341 
was used in the workshop study. Feedback on the condensed version of the rule-set was received from 342 
independent functional safety experts. 343 
4.1. Severity rating rule-set 344 
The severity parameters were mainly influenced by impact energy, characteristics of impact and the 345 
environment (Johansson and Nilsson, 2016a). Therefore, the parameters identified for severity rating 346 
were: 1) vehicle velocity 2) oncoming object velocity 3) type of obstacle 4) type of impact (side, 347 
head-on etc.) 5) gradient of slope 6) magnitude of delta torque (difference between required and 348 
provided torque) 7) maximum acceleration/deceleration 8) mass of vehicle. However, the severity 349 
rule-set depicted in Table 3 is a condensed version of the initial rule-set. A condensed version of the 350 
rule-set (prepared by the authors) was used due to logistical reasons of conducting the validation of 351 
the rule-set. The condensed version of the rule-set was prepared by deleting some of the secondary 352 
parameters like type of collision (head-on, side, rear), gradient of slope, country/city for which the 353 
hazard has been described for etc. These parameters were removed as their effect on severity rating 354 
hadn’t been experimentally evaluated. 355 
 356 
                                                     
2 UK Autodrive project website: http://www.ukautodrive.com/ 
Figure 2: Process of developing initial rule-set with role description for each step 
Type of 
Obstacle 
Vehicle 
Velocity 
Oncoming 
Obj. Velocity 
Severity 
Rating 
 
Type of 
Obstacle 
Vehicle 
Velocity 
Oncoming 
Obj. 
Velocity 
Severity 
Rating 
Pedestrian 
< 11 
km/h 
< 2 km/h S0 
 
Infrastructure 
< 11 
km/h 
0 km/h 
S0 < 6 km/h S1 
 
0 km/h 
< 12km/h S1 
 
0 km/h 
11 - 16 
km/h 
< 2 km/h S1 
 
11 - 16 
km/h 
0 km/h 
S1 < 6 km/h S2 
 
0 km/h 
< 12km/h S2 
 
0 km/h 
> 16 
km/h 
< 2 km/h S2 
 
> 16 
km/h 
0 km/h 
S2 < 6 km/h S3 
 
0 km/h 
< 12km/h S3 
 
0 km/h 
     
 
   
Type of 
Obstacle 
Vehicle 
Velocity 
Oncoming 
Obj. Velocity 
Severity 
Rating 
 
Type of 
Obstacle 
Vehicle 
Velocity 
Oncoming 
Obj. 
Velocity 
Severity 
Rating 
Vehicle 
< 11 
km/h 
< 10 km/h S0 
 
Cyclist 
< 11 
km/h 
< 8 km/h S0 
< 20km/h S1 
 
< 14km/h S1 
> 20 km/h S2 
 
< 20km/h S2 
11 - 16 
km/h 
< 10 km/h S1 
 
11 - 16 
km/h 
< 8 km/h S1 
< 20km/h S1 
 
< 14km/h S2 
> 20 km/h S2 
 
< 20km/h S2 
> 16 
km/h 
< 10 km/h S1 
 
> 16 
km/h 
< 8 km/h S2 
< 20km/h S2 
 
< 14km/h S2 
> 20 km/h S3 
 
< 20km/h S3 
Table 3: Severity rule-set 357 
4.2. Controllability rating rule-set 358 
The controllability parameters were mainly influenced by the vehicle’s ability to change trajectory 359 
and the environment affecting vehicle’s ability to make this change (McGehee et al., 2000; Rosén et 360 
al., 2011; Schaap et al., 2008; Young and Stanton, 2007). The parameters identified for controllability 361 
were: 1) vehicle velocity 2) time-to-collision (TTC) 3) distance to obstacle 3) maximum 362 
acceleration/deceleration 4) availability of safe area 5) road friction 6) gradient of slope. Time-to-363 
collision (TTC) is defined as “the time taken by the trailing vehicle to crash into the front vehicle, if 364 
the vehicles continue in the same path without adjusting their speeds” (Chin and Quek, 1997). Similar 365 
to the severity rule-set, a condensed version of the controllability rule-set was used due to logistical 366 
reasons and is depicted in Table 4. The condensed version was prepared on the similar basis as the 367 
severity rule-set. 368 
 369 
 370 
 371 
 372 
 373 
Emergency Deceleration Value 
Distance to 
Obstacle 
TTC 
Vehicle 
velocity 
Controllability 
Rating 
0.4g - 0.8g 
< 6 m 
< 1.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C2 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C3 
1.0 - 2.0 
sec 
< 11 km/h C1 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C2 
> 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C1 
11 - 16 km/h C0 
> 16 km/h C2 
> 6 m 
< 1.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C2 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C2 
1.0 - 2.0 
sec 
< 11 km/h C0 
11 - 16 km/h C0 
> 16 km/h C2 
> 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C1 
11 - 16 km/h C0 
> 16 km/h C1 
     
Emergency Deceleration Value 
Distance to 
Obstacle 
TTC 
Vehicle 
velocity 
Controllability 
Rating 
< 0.4g 
< 6 m 
< 1.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C3 
11 - 16 km/h C2 
> 16 km/h C3 
1.0 - 2.0 
sec 
< 11 km/h C2 
11 - 16 km/h C2 
> 16 km/h C3 
> 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C2 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C3 
> 6 m 
< 1.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C3 
11 - 16 km/h C2 
> 16 km/h C3 
1.0 - 2.0 
sec 
< 11 km/h C1 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C3 
> 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C2 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C2 
Table 4: Controllability rule-set 374 
5. Results 375 
5.1. Quantitative Results:  376 
Each group was asked to provide a rating for Severity, Exposure and Controllability for the two 377 
hazardous events for each round of their discussion. 378 
Figure 3 shows the ASIL ratings provided by the individual groups in different rounds. Different 379 
rounds have been plotted on the x-axis and the ASIL ratings have been plotted on the y-axis. Rules for 380 
HARA were provided only in round 3 and round 4. In the first round, (when no rules were provided to 381 
the participants), each group came up with a different ASIL rating with significant differences. The 382 
difference between the groups were of the order of two for group 1 and group 3 (ASIL A and ASIL C 383 
for first hazardous event) and group 2 and group 3 (QM and ASIL B for second hazardous event). The 384 
difference with the other group was of the order of one. Round two proved to have some convergence 385 
in the ratings, however there were still significant differences in the ASIL ratings. For hazardous 386 
event 1, two groups converged to an ASIL rating of ASIL C, while the third group differed 387 
significantly with an ASIL rating of QM which means the difference was of the order three. For 388 
hazardous event 2, while two of the groups converged at an ASIL A rating, the third group gave a QM 389 
rating which meant a difference of the order of 1. It is interesting to observe that the group giving QM 390 
rating to hazard 1 and hazard 2 were different.  391 
The signification variation in the ASIL ratings provided by the groups in round 1 and round 2, 392 
illustrates the low reliability (inter-rater) of the current automotive hazard analysis method, even when 393 
done by experts in the industry. While every group was provided with the same hazardous events to 394 
rate, each of them had a different justification for the ASIL rating provided by them. The difference 395 
demonstrates the inter-rater variability in automotive HARA due to presence of subjectivity which is 396 
caused by the experts’ mental models. This makes the HARA process unreliable as per the R2 and R3 397 
criteria of reliability mentioned by (Aven and Heide, 2009). The variation in the HARA ratings will 398 
be discussed in more detail in the qualitative analysis section (section 5.2).  399 
Before round 3, rules for HARA were introduced to the participants and they were asked to use the 400 
rules to perform the HARA. It was expected that the introduction of the rule-set would introduce 401 
objectivity in the HARA process and potentially lead to a convergence in the ASIL ratings from the 402 
Figure 3: ASIL ratings for hazard 1 and hazard 2 given by experts in different rounds (as per Figure 1) 
Round 1 and Round 2: without rule-set; Round 3 and Round 4: with rule-set 
three groups of experts. However, the results (as depicted in Figure 3), illustrate the opposite. In round 403 
3, for both hazardous event 1 and hazardous event 2, the three groups provided three different ASIL 404 
ratings with a maximum difference of order two and the minimum difference of order one. This was 405 
contrary to the expectation of the authors. However, the qualitative analysis of the round 3 results 406 
(section 5.2) provide a deeper insight on the cause of the variation. Round 4 provided an interesting 407 
set of results for hazardous event 1 and hazardous event 2, with convergence in ratings achieved for 408 
hazardous event 2.  409 
The ASIL ratings for hazardous event 1 between rounds 1-2 and rounds 3-4, show a visual decrease in 410 
variation (Figure 3), indicating shift towards convergence, potentially due to the introduction of rule-411 
set. In an ideal situation, for a fully reliable HARA, the variation in ratings should be zero. While 412 
ASIL ratings for hazardous event 1 provided by different groups varied significantly (with a 413 
maximum variation of order 2 and a minimum variation of order 1), ASIL ratings for hazardous event 414 
2 converged for all groups at ASIL A. At a higher level, it might seem that the convergence of the 415 
ASIL rating for hazardous event 2 is a result of the introduction of the rule-set by the authors. But a 416 
more granular analysis of the components of ASIL provides a different view. As discussed in section 417 
2, an ASIL rating is comprised of a severity rating (S), exposure rating (E) and a controllability rating 418 
(C). The authors will now discuss the S, E and C ratings provided by the different groups in different 419 
rounds. Figure 4-6 depict the severity, exposure and the controllability ratings respectively for hazard 420 
1 and hazard 2. 421 
Severity: In round 1, while two groups agreed on the severity rating, the third group provided a rating 422 
with a difference of order two for hazardous event 1 (Figure 4). In round two, all the groups 423 
converged in their severity rating at S3 for hazardous event 1. With the introduction of rules in round 424 
3, while two of the groups converged in their severity rating at S2 (which was different from their 425 
round 2 ratings), the third group gave a rating (S3) which differed in the rating of the other two groups 426 
by the order of one. In round 4, after the groups were mixed, a similar spread was found with two 427 
groups agreeing in their severity rating at S2, while the third group gave a rating of S3. The group 428 
giving a diverging rating to the others was different in round 3 and round 4. For hazardous event 2, 429 
two groups converged completely across all the rounds. However, the third group showed significant 430 
variation across the rounds. In round 1, the severity rating of the third group was in agreement with 431 
Figure 4: Severity ratings for hazard 1 and hazard 2 given by experts (in different rounds (as per Figure 1) 
Round 1 and Round 2: without rule-set; Round 3 and Round 4: with rule-set 
the other groups at S1. However, in round 2, the group gave a rating of S2. With introduction of rules, 432 
the group gave a severity rating of S3 and S2 in round 3 and round 4 respectively. 433 
Exposure: In the workshop experiment, the authors didn’t provide rules for exposure rating. While 434 
this was due to the authors’ understanding of exposure rating being almost certainly being constant, 435 
the experiment was also designed to see if there was any intra-rater variability, i.e., variation in the 436 
same group of people with experience. In case any intra-rater variance was present, this would be seen 437 
in the ratings of round 2 and round 3, as the groups in the two rounds were identical. While there was 438 
no evidence of intra-rater variability in the exposure ratings, a significant degree of inter-rater 439 
variability existed among the different groups across various rounds (Figure 5). Contrary to the 440 
authors’ hypothesis, the variation of exposure ratings was high, as compared the severity and the 441 
controllability ratings for hazardous event 1. While the same was true for rounds 1-2 for hazardous 442 
event 2, rounds 3-4 for hazardous event 2 showed the least variation for exposure rating. 443 
Controllability: Controllability ratings for hazardous event 1 showed a similar variation as that of the 444 
severity ratings. However, the variation for controllability ratings rose for both the hazardous events,  445 
with the introduction of the rules. This could potentially be due to the interpretation of the rules 446 
provided to the participants.  447 
Ideally, the introduction of the rule-set for HARA should have led to zero variation in the severity, 448 
exposure, controllability and ASIL ratings. While the reduction was observed in some of the ratings 449 
(Figure 6), it is important to analyse the results qualitatively (section 5.2) to explain the deviation. 450 
Figure 5: Exposure ratings for hazard 1 and hazard 2 given by experts in different rounds (as per Figure 1). 
Round 1 and Round 2: without rule-set; Round 3 and Round 4: with rule-set 
 451 
5.2. Qualitative Results: 452 
Each of the three groups were asked to provide answers to the questions mentioned in section 3.3 453 
about their experience of HARA in the different rounds of the workshop. While answering the first 454 
question about experiencing variation in hazard analysis discussions, all three groups mentioned that 455 
they had experienced variation in HARA discussions in different rounds. All three groups concurred 456 
that the source of variation was the different perspectives presented by different individuals present in 457 
the group. However, the reasons for varying perspectives differed between the groups. One of the 458 
groups mentioned that the HARA is dependent on person’s experience and their previous 459 
training/understanding of the rating procedure in HARA. This coincides with the literature discussed 460 
earlier (in section 1) about the background knowledge of the experts being one of the reasons for 461 
subjectivity (Aven and Zio, 2014). Another group mentioned that experts from different cultures, 462 
perceived “severity” and “exposure” ratings differently and there is a need to provide context 463 
regarding the environment for which the product is being made. Although, limited literature exists to 464 
support the cultural factor as a source of subjectivity in HARA, recent studies in other domains like 465 
occupational health and safety (OHS) have indicated this trend also (Aven and Zio, 2014; Tchiehe and 466 
Gauthier, 2017). Having participants from North America and different European countries was 467 
beneficial in observing this trend in the study presented in this paper. 468 
Two out of the three groups agreed in their response to the second question on saying that the 469 
introduction of rules by parametrizing HARA made the process more objective. While the third group 470 
disagreed with the statement, but qualified their response by mentioning that the rules, the parameters 471 
and their relationship were open to subjective interpretation. The other two groups mentioned that the 472 
rules needed to be re-calibrated in certain areas (like introducing context for the rules) and more 473 
examples and instructions need to be provided before using the rules. This is further established by the 474 
fact that each of the groups in round three and four (while using the rules for HARA) made different 475 
initial assumptions about the system and the hazard due to which they came to a different severity and 476 
controllability rating. This emphasizes the importance of the initial assumptions made by the experts 477 
performing the HARA and was also highlighted by one of the groups in their feedback. Providing 478 
context to the rule-set could potentially help to remove the subjective nature of the initial assumptions 479 
and will be introduced in future workshop studies. 480 
Figure 6: Controllability ratings for hazard 1 and hazard 2 given by experts in different rounds (as per Figure 1).  
Round 1 and Round 2: without rule-set; Round 3 and Round 4: with rule-set 
6. Discussion 481 
Due to logistical reasons of conducting a workshop, a condensed rule-set (mentioned in section 4) was 482 
provided to the participants. As participants were experts, they made subjective interpretation on 483 
aspects of the rules that were not presented to them during the workshop (e.g. type of collision). This 484 
introduced an element of subjectivity. This was confirmed with the qualitative analysis of the 485 
feedback provided by the three groups. However, this scenario was not foreseen by the authors 486 
initially, and has now been taken into consideration in the formation of the re-calibrated rule-set. 487 
Another aspect highlighted in the qualitative analysis of the feedback was on the need for a few 488 
example cases and training to use the provided rule-set. This would potentially aid the experts’ 489 
understanding on how to use the rule-set provided for performing HARA. In order to overcome the 490 
challenge due to unclear understanding of the process, based on the feedback from this study, the 491 
authors plan to extend the rule-set introduction time during future workshop/focus groups and also 492 
incorporate a few example cases.  493 
An objective approach to the decision making process involved in an automotive HARA has many 494 
potential benefits. Not only does it have the potential to increase the inter-rater reliability of the 495 
process, it provides the ability to automate the HARA process which in turn can save precious time in 496 
the automotive product life-cycle. Moreover, it can potentially provide a degree of consistency across 497 
the automotive supply chain (i.e., OEMs, Tier 1 suppliers, Tier 2 suppliers etc.). While some of the 498 
results suggest positive results towards increased reliability through convergence of HARA ratings, it 499 
is not known that convergence would ever occur but this work has shown that introduction of an 500 
objective rule-set has a potential to increase the reliability of HARA ratings. 501 
Since, contrary to the authors’ hypothesis, it was found that the exposure ratings were also subject to 502 
high degree of variation, an additional rule-set for exposure ratings will also be introduced in future 503 
workshops. It is believed that an exposure rule-set along with the context definition should potentially 504 
be able to bring convergence in the exposure ratings and hence ASIL ratings too. 505 
One of the potential future benefits of having an objective rule-set is that it paves the way for dynamic 506 
HARA. With the introduction of automated systems, a concept of dynamic HARA has been 507 
introduced recently to enable the automated system to determine its ASIL rating based on the 508 
situational health of the sensors and the automated system and the environmental conditions 509 
(Johansson and Nilsson, 2016a; Villa et al., 2016). The approach presented in this paper constitutes 510 
one of the blocks of a dynamic HARA and may aid in a reliable hazardous event rating in the dynamic 511 
HARA process (Johansson and Nilsson, 2016b). Additionally, it can potentially allow relatively 512 
unskilled practitioners with less experience, to perform HARA to a reliable degree as the need for 513 
highly specialized knowledge is reduced to a great extent. This could ease the process in terms of time 514 
and resources required for the HARA. 515 
The hazard and the hazardous events chosen for the workshop study were a small part of a larger 516 
collection of hazards and hazardous events. The full collection was created as a result of a safety 517 
analysis of the low-speed autonomous vehicle. While the independent group of experts who 518 
performed the safety analysis had full information about the system and the hazards, the expert 519 
participants in the workshop study had limited information about given hazard. In some of the 520 
qualitative feedback, participants mentioned the need for more information. However, the authors also 521 
noticed from the discussion notes of the expert panels that they found it hard to implement the 522 
classification method. In order to mitigate such instances, the authors will provide a new set of hazard 523 
and hazardous events with more information about the situation and context in future workshops. 524 
7. Future work 525 
Having discussed the potential benefits of the proposed method, there are a few challenges of the 526 
proposed objective HARA approach also. Hazard identification and HARA are two aspects of the 527 
safety analysis. While the former requires creativity to identify possible hazards, a more structured 528 
framework for HARA provides more guidance to experts, potentially eliminating subjective 529 
interpretation. However, it is imperative that the rules created are exhaustive and valid, to ensure the 530 
validity of the ratings. While this work didn’t explicitly focus on validity of the rule-set or HARA 531 
ratings, future work includes establishing the validity of the rule-set. Some efforts were made to have 532 
a valid initial rule-set and these have been discussed in section 4. Multiple iterations of using the re-533 
calibrated rule-set in future focus groups and workshop studies would ensure the validity of the rule-534 
set as the experts will be asked for their feedback on the both the validity of the rules and the 535 
objective HARA process. Feedback received at the end of each iteration will be used to re-calibrate 536 
the rules till full convergence in ratings is achieved.  537 
Results of upcoming focus-groups/workshop experiments will be published in future manuscripts. 538 
The aim of the future workshops will be to extend and re-calibrate the rule-set to get full convergence 539 
in HARA ratings between different groups of experts when the rule-set is used. 540 
Additionally, future implementation of the dynamic HARA work completed, will also involve 541 
extending the parameters for objectification to include driver-related parameters, e.g. age of the 542 
driver, level of training, level of attention, etc. Another interesting area of research is the application 543 
of the proposed approach in other domains like process, aviation etc. to improve the reliability of the 544 
risk analysis process. 545 
8. Conclusions 546 
The authors have presented a novel approach by creating a rule-set for conducting automotive HARA 547 
which has a potential to mitigate any inter-rater variations caused by subjective nature of the 548 
functional safety experts’ mental models and background knowledge. The proposed objective 549 
approach to HARA involves parametrization of the various automotive HARA parameters, i.e., 550 
Severity and Controllability. In this paper, rule-sets of severity and controllability ratings have been 551 
presented.  552 
The low reliability, i.e. intra-rater variation, of the current automotive HARA process has been 553 
demonstrated through experimental evidence. A significant difference of the order of two was 554 
observed among the different groups for ASIL, severity and controllability ratings. The main focus of 555 
the presented approach was on, the inter-rater reliability. The ASIL ratings for hazardous event 2 556 
converged to ASIL A in the last round with the rule-set. Based on the feedback from participants and 557 
the qualitative analysis of the initial rule-set, the rules were re-calibrated. One of the themes that was 558 
observed in the qualitative analysis of the feedback was the need to put in a context to the hazard in 559 
the HARA. The perception of severity, exposure and controllability varies in different context. 560 
Additionally, the experts mentioned the need for parameters like type of collision (side, front, rear) to 561 
be added to the rule-set as they had made an assumption due to the lack of the parameter in the rule-562 
set. 563 
While introduction of the rule-set has shown signs of improved reliability of HARA ratings, further 564 
work is needed to use the re-calibrated rule-set and this will be conducted with future workshops and 565 
focus group studies involving large number of functional safety experts in the coming months. More 566 
iterations of the rule-set may occur based on the feedback and results from the future workshop 567 
studies. 568 
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